



Upjohn Institute Press 
 
 



















Chapter 7 (pp. 169-186) in: 
Dragon versus Eagle: The Chinese Economy and U.S.-China Relations 
Wei-Chiao Huang and Huizhong Zhou, eds. 




Copyright ©2012. W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. All rights reserved. 
Dragon versus Eagle






W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Kalamazoo, Michigan
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Dragon versus Eagle : the Chinese economy and U.S.-China relations / Wei-Chiao 
Huang, Huizhong Zhou, editors.
  pages cm
 Includes bibliographical references and index.
 ISBN 978-0-88099-403-3 (pbk. : alk. paper) — ISBN 0-88099-403-7 (pbk. : alk. 
paper) — ISBN 978-0-88099-404-0 (hardcover : alk. paper) — ISBN 0-88099-404-5 
(hardcover : alk. paper)
 1.  Economic development—China. 2.  China—Economic policy. 3.  China—
Foreign economic relations—United States. 4.  United States—Foreign economic 





W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007-4686
The facts presented in this study and the observations and viewpoints expressed are 
the sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily represent positions of 
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Cover design by Alcorn Publication Design.
Index prepared by Diane Worden.
Printed in the United States of America.





Yale School of Management
The People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, and its cur-
rent economic reforms were implemented beginning in 1978 following 
the end of the Cultural Revolution. Since then, China has become an 
economic powerhouse, neatly timing the advent of globalization and 
organized free trade.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine historical trends in, and 
the impact of, modern reforms on the Chinese economy; to look at what 
is likely to happen to growth, earnings, and savings over the next four 
decades; and to compare the Chinese economy to the U.S. economy 
over this period of time.  
THE BIG PICTURE
Figure 7.1 shows a likely growth pattern of the Chinese economy in 
the coming decades. It depicts three different phases. The initial phase 
goes from 2010 to 2016, during which no major shifts in the growth 
model of the Chinese economy will likely occur. Growth continues at a 
rate of about 8.5 percent per year despite the likelihood that the Chinese 
government will implement substantial changes in policies relating 
to investments, exports, and domestic consumption that could impact 
growth. Although there is much talk in the Chinese media about how 
reforms in these sectors will have a negative effect, it is unlikely such 
reforms will have much negative impact due to political reasons and 
other complications. 
It is presumed that, in 2016, there will be a peak of the Chinese 
economy in the real term followed by a downturn—the second phase—
of 12 percent in the year 2017. Why a 12 percent decline? This predic-
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tion is inferred from the Asian fi nancial crisis that occurred in 1998. 
There are many similarities between the current Chinese economy and 
the Korean economy during that period. As shown in Figure 7.2, per 
capita GDP in Korea rose sharply during the fi rst half of the 1990s only 
to drop precipitously beginning in 1997. I assume a similar pattern will 
occur in the Chinese economy. 
However, it should be noted that other organizations predict con-
tinued, steady growth during this period. For instance, the Conference 
Board (2012) projects growth at 8.0 percent in 2012, 6.0 percent annu-
ally in 2013–2016, and 3.5 percent annually in 2017–2025.
After the setback in 2017, the Chinese economy should resume its 
growth—the third phase. When this occurs, beginning in 2017–2018, 
the growth rate should be 5–6 percent per year through 2049. The Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) projects average annual growth of 5.56 
percent for years 2009–2050 (Dadush and Stancil 2009). During this 
same period, some analysts predict that the U.S. economy would grow 
at 3 percent per year, which is possibly an optimistic prediction con-
sidering its unsteady growth rate in recent years. The IMF projects an 
Figure 7.1  Possible Future Path for the United States and China
NOTE: Assumptions: China’s GDP grows at 8.5 percent until 2016, declines by 12 per-
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annual growth rate for the United States of 2.7 percent over the same 
period.
The resumption of growth should occur due to socially and politi-
cally acceptable reforms that commonly take place in any economy, 
including the U.S. economy and the economies of other advanced 
nations, when hit by crisis. In fact, a looming economic crisis is partly 
what spurred the reformers led by Deng Xiaoping to undertake major 
political and economic reforms in 1978 just after the Mao-era Cultural 
Revolution, during which many people were displaced or lost their lives 
or property for proposing political and economic changes. Without 
Deng’s reforms, the Chinese economy and society overall would not 
have evolved to what it is today. 
Even now, China’s economy is heavily infl uenced by its major 
policymakers. Fundamentally, there should be incentives for major 
political, economic, and cultural changes to a society. From 1979 to 
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Figure 7.2  GDP per Capita for Korea, 1990–2000 (current $)
SOURCE: EconStats (2012).
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areas in order to maintain strong and continued economic growth, and I 
predict they will continue this process even after 2017–2018. 
As seen in Figure 7.1, in 2049, China’s nominal GDP should sur-
pass the United States’ nominal GDP, under the ceteris paribus assump-
tion that the RMB-dollar exchange rate remains relatively stable over 
time. If purchasing power parity (PPP) is taken into account, China’s 
GDP is projected to surpass the United States’ GDP in 2027, about 22 
years earlier than in the nominal term. 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Let us take a historical look at the Chinese economy using Figure 
7.3. The per capita GDP of China up until 1950 was almost stagnant 
and remained around $500 per annum. From 1950 to 1973, the GDP per 
capita per annum increased about 60 percent, and from 1973 to 1998 it 
increased by about 300 percent. Furthermore, it continued to grow so 
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that the GDP per capita in 2011 is estimated at $5,184 (IMF 2011). In 
short, as shown in Figure 7.3, most of the growth in China’s per capita 
GDP occurred in the last 30 to 60 years. 
Figure 7.4 provides a more detailed look at the rapid growth in per 
capita GDP that occurred recently using PPP-adjusted dollars. Using 
this measure, the fi gure shows that per capita GDP increased by a factor 
of 20 times over the period 1980–2009.
Observing income growth and productivity growth together helps 
provide a more complete picture of China’s long-term economic prog-
ress. Here I focus on the income side, and for comparison I provide a 
measure for how much in terms of consumables a laborer earns for a 
day’s labor.
Figure 7.5 provides a timeline showing real earnings in terms of 
meat and rice. In 1769, a day’s labor earned a typical worker about 3 jins 
(China’s unit of weight measurement as equivalent to pounds) of meat; 
in 1850 it was around 2 pounds. From then until 1973 a day’s labor 



























earned less than 2 jins. Currently, a typical Chinese laborer earns the 
equivalent of about 10 jins of meat per day, which implies that workers 
today are about 4 times as productive as the workers before 1973, even 
taking into consideration the rising prices. Rice as a measure followed 
a similar path, but beginning in 1973, the productivity increase is even 
greater, almost 10 times that before 1973. 
What has caused such growth and progress in China? Many econo-
mists and commentators say it is due to the vast amount of cheap labor 
available in China. But, in fact, China’s population has been declin-
ing as the share of the global population. In 1830, China had about 
40 percent of the world’s population. In 1913, China’s population was 
one-third of the world’s population. China now has roughly 1.4 billion 
Figure 7.5  Real Earnings per Day for a Beijing Worker
NOTE: This fi gure is based on the assumption that the daily earning in 1769 was 77 
Tongchien (copper dollar, currency unit in Qing Dynasty); in 1973 $1 Chinese Yuan 
(Chinese dollar, Renminbi): and nowadays $50 Chinese Yuan.
SOURCE: Various sources. The price indices in Qing Dynasty come from the fi les of 
Holland East Indian Company.
Ji
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people, or about 20 percent of the global population. So the argument 
that China’s vast and low-cost workforce is the main driving force of 
economic growth is well grounded. If such a labor force was available 
in the past, why didn’t China experience growth earlier on? In addition, 
in 2011 the minimum wage in China was raised in most of the country 
by 21.7 percent, making China’s labor force higher paid than several of 
its East Asian neighbors (BBC 2011). What is it, then, that propels such 
dynamic economic growth in China?
To understand the driving factor of economic growth of present-
day China, let’s consider a quote from a book published in Shanghai in 
1914, Finance in China (Wagel 1914). The following excerpt, quoted 
then in the New York Times, highlighted the threat of China’s economy 
to Western economies:
It is often said that the peril of today is not the Chinese behind the 
gun, but the Chinese as the manufacturers of guns and of many 
other things, equally calling for the highest technical skill. It has 
been the fashion of newspaper writers dealing with the develop-
ment of China to state that the danger to the West lies in the indus-
trial expansion of China, and it is averred that the Chinese, with 
their cheap labour and keen aptitude for imitation, competing with 
the dear labour and the heavy cost of transportation of the West, 
would certainly be able to beat the latter. (Wagel 1914, p. 291)
 After the publication of Wagel’s book, Western nations became 
nervous about China’s rise because they thought that China would inev-
itably become economically dominant due to, as Wagel points out, its 
cheap labor relative to the West. However, such anxieties were some-
times seen as contributing factors that helped foment the Cultural Revo-
lution, war, and other disruptions in China. 
In what way is China different now from its past? Figure 7.6 shows 
the correlation between GDP growth and the population of China over 
several centuries to 2008.
Going back to 1600, the correlation between population and GDP 
growth was almost 100 percent. By 1820, the correlation remained very 
high, almost 97 percent. These high correlations were due to the fact that 
labor was the primary, if not the sole, factor of production. During that 
period, modern technology was practically nonexistent, production was 
almost exclusively labor intensive, therefore GDP grew in step with the 
population. It wasn’t until the effects of the industrial revolution spread 
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to China in the latter part of the nineteenth century that the correlation 
declined. Production became more capital intensive, and hence the cor-
relation between population and GDP declined. This decrease contin-
ued until after 1950 when it began to increase. The correlation grew 
more quickly beginning around 1973 as China began to take advantage 
of the trend of globalization and a freer trade environment. 
Globalization opened up more of the Chinese economy to inter-
national markets mainly due to the establishment of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), whose policies tend to benefi t China more than 
other economies. This international order of trade that has been encour-
aged by Western industrialized economies is a key reason for China’s 
economic success during the past 30 years. 
In the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, the inter-
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Figure 7.6  Long-Term Trends: Correlation between China’s Population 
and GDP Size
SOURCE: Maddison (2001).
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a gunboat-based order rather than a rule-based order. The East India 
Company of the eighteenth century is an example of a successful prac-
titioner of gunboat-based order. It maintained its own navy and military 
power, facilitating its participation in international trade. Eventually, 
technology developed during the industrial revolution in the Western 
nations spread to China, enabling it to transition from a gunboat-based 
economy to a rule-based economy. Today, rule-based order provides the 
basis for the entry of multinational corporations in China such as Gen-
eral Electric, whose army of lawyers help it conduct business.
Gunboat-based and rule-based trade and investment have vast dif-
ferences in transaction costs. For instance, employing lawyers is less 
expensive than maintaining a military force. Therefore, the transaction 
costs for trade today are less than during the gunboat-based age. This 
allows China to incur much lower transaction costs for trade today and 
serves as another reason why its economy is less encumbered and freer 
to grow. 
Let’s compare the reforms under Deng Xiaoping in 1978 with those 
made in the nineteenth century under the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911). 
During the Qing Dynasty, Li Hongzhang, a leading statesman, built 
military power that allowed China to become economically competi-
tive. Without this power China would not have been able to engage, on 
a signifi cant scale, in international trade and investment. On the other 
hand, Deng Xiaoping did not have to build military power to compete 
for trade. Instead he implemented market-oriented rules and regulations 
that attracted foreign direct investment and international trade.
Figure 7.7 shows the per capita GDP of China and the rest of the 
world from over 2000 years ago until the end of the twentieth century. 
As depicted by the steep slope of the line, China began gaining on the 
rest of the world after 1973, when globalization and the reforms imple-
mented fi ve years later began to have an impact. 
As Wagel (1914) pointed out, China is sometimes characterized as 
having a keen ability to imitate new technologies that were developed 
by others, and the gains China has made since 1973 are due to such 
imitation. However, there are both pros and cons to this depiction. It is 
an advantage when countries only need to imitate in order to be able to 
pursue fast growth. However, such growth can also impede incentives 
to innovate and to conduct timely institutional reforms, so imitation can 
also be seen as a disadvantage.
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Cost-saving manufacturing technologies developed in the twenti-
eth century spread throughout the world in part due to policies imple-
mented by the WTO. China became the major benefactor of this dis-
persal of technology. Still, there is another factor that helps to explain 
the success of China’s economy in the last 30 years: the change in 
policies that affect the decision making on resource allocation and its 
control. China’s economic policies are formulated in such a way that 
they are conducive to fast economic growth despite the fact that there 
are some negative side-effects that resulted, such as the dominance of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in certain industries, environmental 
degradation, crowding-out of private property to the public sector, and 
substandard working conditions. 
The rising pace of factor productivity growth can be attributed in 
part to overinvestment and the emergence of excess capacity in a num-
ber of important industries. China emerged as the world’s largest steel 
producer in 1996 when its output reached 100 million metric tons, put-
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ting it ahead of both the United States and Japan for the fi rst time. The 
industry has continued to grow at a rapid pace. This is an example of 
the extent of China’s industrialization and serves as just one example 
of an SOE that contributes substantially to the growth of its economy.
World Trade Organization membership had an immediate impact 
on Chinese economic growth, paving the way for more effi cient day-
to-day operations of Chinese corporations while reducing the risk 
premium investors applied to investment in the country. In addition, 
WTO membership established a powerful catalyst for a more serious 
approach to economic reform and industrial effi ciency. As the benefi ts 
of those changes materialized, China achieved sustainable incremental 
economic growth while gradually reducing the risk premium of invest-
ment. This signifi cantly cut the discount at which Chinese equities 
have traded against global market peers. As a major force driving the 
national economy of China, the fast expansion of SOEs has contributed 
signifi cantly to China becoming the world’s second-largest economy.
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTIVE ASSETS 
At the end of 2006, according to government records, land owned 
by the government was valued at 50 trillion RMB. At the same time, 
there were about 119,000 SOEs valued at about 29 trillion RMB. 
Therefore, the combined value of government land ownership plus 
SOEs amounted to 79 trillion RMB, which was roughly one-tenth of 
comparable U.S. government holdings. A few years later these values 
grew due to the expanding economy and land value appreciation. While 
at the end of 2006 state-owned assets were roughly 76 percent of the 
total national wealth in China, in 2010 that percentage likely declined 
to roughly 70 percent of the total national wealth because of the increas-
ing trend toward privatization, particularly in the industrial sector. 
Figure 7.8 shows a comparison of total government expenditures 
with total household expenditures in China as a percentage of GDP. 
In 1952, household consumption was about 69 percent of GDP, pretty 
close to today’s household expenditures in the United States, which is 
roughly 71 percent of GDP. At the founding of the People’s Republic of 
China, the economy was driven by household consumption. Over the 
180   Chen
years, during the planned economy period, this consumption declined 
so that now it is roughly 36 percent of GDP. Even in the reform period 
this share continues to decline. On the other hand, government expendi-
ture as a percentage of GDP increased from 16 percent in 1952 to about 
30 percent in the 2000s. Government expenditures as a share of GDP 
have almost doubled in the last 60 years, while private consumption 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP declined. 
The government in China also has practically unchecked taxation 
power. To introduce a new tax or to raise tax rates, the government 
doesn’t have to go through parliamentary debates. The ministry of 
fi nance and state council generally meet together and make new tax 
policy. It is somewhat daunting that a few people could simply gather 
in a room at the time of their choosing and make decisions that may 
alter the tax rates and policies of the world’s second-largest economy. 
There is no accountability to the taxpayers. As a result, government 
Figure 7.8  China’s Household Consumption vs. Government 
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expenditures as the share of GDP, as the bold line depicts in the fi gure, 
trend upward. 
The Chinese government’s budget was roughly 8 trillion RMB in 
2010, which is about half of the U.S. annual government budget at the 
current exchange rate. But, if we use PPP, the Chinese budget may actu-
ally be bigger than the U.S. budget. The main question facing China’s 
policymakers is how to spend that 8 trillion RMB. Social groups and 
political leaders are both infl uential in this decision. In China the politi-
cal situation infl uences the distribution of resources, including how 
the budget is apportioned to different provinces and societies. Public 
accountability of the government budget spending is still waiting on 
establishment of the democratic institutions in China. 
The growing concern among those tracking China’s economy comes 
from the fact that SOEs, which were previously focused on manufac-
turing industries, are entering the fi nancial industry, thereby expand-
ing their infl uence further into the economy. They are doing so for two 
reasons: 1) it is useful for satisfying their own development needs and 
assures that they receive the fi nancial support they need to grow, and 2) 
some SOEs see value in having a fi nancial license or room for fi nancial 
equity growth, and thus hope to profi t from undertakings in fi nance. 
However, I believe that these two points, taken either individually or 
together, are not suffi cient reasons to justify allowing SOEs’ expansion 
into the fi nancial domain.
SAVING
It is true that Chinese people generally save more of their income 
than people of other nationalities. As Figure 7.9 shows, the gross sav-
ings rate as a percentage of GDP rose from around 40 percent in 1992 to 
about 50 percent in 2006. However, looking at just the household sec-
tor’s savings as a percentage of GDP, there is little variation over that 
period of time, staying at about 20 percent, although trending slightly 
upward in the 2000s. This relatively steady rate is due mainly to the fall 
in the share of household income as a share of national income rather 
than a decline in the household savings rate (Prasad 2009). 
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Savings by SOEs has been more evident. Beginning in 2003, SOEs’ 
savings rate as a percentage of GDP jumped sharply from about 15 per-
cent to over 20 percent before falling back slightly. The SOEs are not 
subject to monitoring by the National People’s Congress or other gov-
ernmental agencies, and they are not required to redistribute profi ts or 
remit them to the Ministry of Finance. Their profi ts and increased value 
are not translated into consumption since households do not receive 
these benefi ts. The same is true for the sales of land and SOEs them-
selves, the proceeds of which go to the government treasury. Govern-
ment saving also increased gradually to about 9 percent from a steady 5 
percent seen throughout the 1990s.
Figure 7.10 shows gross savings as a percentage of GDP in seven 
other industrialized nations—including the United States—and the 
world overall. Note that, over the same period of 1992–2006, the rate 
ranges from a low of 13.3 percent (in Canada in 1992) to a high of 33.8 
percent (in Japan, also in 1992). The U.S. rate ranges from a low of 
14.4 percent in 1993 to a high of 18.8 percent in 1998 (EconStats 2012). 
SOURCE: China Statistical Yearbook (1995–2009). Flow of Funds Accounts.
Figure 7.9  Household, Enterprise, and Government Savings as a 
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Therefore, it is apparent that China’s gross savings rate is quite high rel-
ative to other large nations, which is one reason why its policymakers 
are encouraging domestic consumption, which has not been growing as 
fast as GDP, as a means of rebalancing the nation’s growth and reducing 
its account surplus.
SUMMARY
China’s economy is mainly investment and export driven as opposed 
to being driven by domestic consumption like the U.S. economy is. 
Because of that, the consequences are that the economy is too depen-
dent on these sectors. It also fi nds itself overly dependent on energy-
intensive industries and insuffi ciently so on the service sector. Transi-
tioning to a more balanced economy, one in which private consumption 
SOURCE: EconStats (2012).
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plays a greater role, will be a challenge for China’s economic policy-
makers. Because of the political pressure applied by the vested interest 
group who benefi t from the current policies, there is no incentive for 
them to alter policy in order to transition to a more balanced economy. 
Other problematic consequences resulting from how China’s economy 
has developed include the crowding out of private fi rms in industries 
in which SOEs became dominant players and barriers to legal develop-
ment and the rule of law in the economy. 
Still, the current model for economic growth in China will likely 
continue despite recessions and other economic uncertainty worldwide. 
In fact, these issues emphasize the importance of a highly coordinated 
state-controlled economy, particularly the rising infl uence of SOEs 
through state-owned banks and other fi nancial institutions. 
To summarize, the economic benefi ts accrued as a result of the indus-
trial revolution have been completely absorbed into China’s economy, 
as have the benefi ts from the international movement of investment and 
capital. China’s current growth may be attributed mainly to government 
sector involvements in the economy. Risks remain, however. These 
include being overly reliant on the government-dominated economic 
model, the ascending SOEs and the power they continue to amass, an 
increasingly tougher environment for private and foreign fi rms to oper-
ate freely in, and the fact that local governments are becoming major 
borrowers from banks.
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